THE POST-MILITARY WEST: GLOBALIZATION'S IMPACT ON U.S. STRATEGIC CULTURE
Globalization has been heralded by its proponents as a force for positive change in the world and, by its detractors, as a cause of many of its current conflicts. One of the most researched aspects of globalization is how it influences culture. While this may be of general interest to sociologists and other academics, knowledge of general culture shifts caused by globalization may not be of great interest to strategic leaders. However, if globalization were to affect change in the strategic leader's own culture, or in an adversary's strategic culture, it is an important condition to monitor, since strategic culture shapes policy-making and influences how a country fights its wars.
1
This SRP examines the possible impact on American strategic culture through the lens of world cultural change as a result of globalization.
Globalization
Globalization has created varying effects all over the globe, both positive and negative. While it brings technology, medicine and modern conveniences to underdeveloped or remote areas, it has also enabled environmental destruction.
Hitherto pristine wilderness areas are stripped of their trees and minerals by international conglomerates in their quests to secure the shrinking reserves of the world's resources. These effects are profound, but not germane to the subject of this paper. This essay considers globalization's cultural effects on the United States in particular, and the rest of Western civilization in general. It argues that the United
States' strategic culture is trending back to its classic liberal roots, and perhaps further toward a post-military culture.
For the purpose of this study, globalization needs to be defined in terms of strategic leadership, and not via cultural or sociological lenses. For the strategic leader, globalization is defined well by Robert Cooper, a senior British diplomat, when he writes "The essence of globalization is that it erodes the distinction between domestic and foreign events." 2 Cooper is describing the opening or blurring of borders that has occurred in the modern era. The blurring of borders is both physical, through modern transportation and open-borders institutions and trade agreements like the European Union or NAFTA, and invisible or psychological, through mass communications and the internet. The result is greater awareness of the societies, culture and politics of other countries. Due to this interconnectedness, crises anywhere in the world can affect security everywhere else, creating the impetus for prosperous nations to attempt to intervene and restore order and balance to the system. 3 A classic example is the affect of crises in the Middle East on global oil supplies and the frequent diplomatic and military interventions attempted by the U.S. and Europe. Thus foreign problems become domestic ones.
Another effect of the opening of borders is the increase in migration, mainly from Over time, these immigrants will impact the culture of their adopted countries if they continue to resist assimilation. So far, Middle Eastern immigrants in the U.S. have assimilated to a high degree. 5 The main strategic effect of globalization on the United States is the result of the effective shrinking or "flattening" of the world, as Thomas Friedman so famously declared. 6 For centuries, the U.S. was geographically isolated from the rest of the world powers. Its security was ensured, giving it the option to intervene in international affairs.
With the advent of non-state actors pursuing weapons of mass destruction to employ against American cities, the U.S. has lost its geographic isolation. 7 How this loss of isolation affects the values and culture of American society should be of great interest to a strategic leader.
A generally positive aspect of globalization to Westerners is cultural. As we become more interconnected, more cultural exchanges take place, usually to the benefit of greater understanding on both sides. The vast increase in types of communication enabled by globalization has advanced a continuous debate among world societies on every possible topic. Through the debating process, it is plausible to assume that the vast majority of the world's literate are being exposed to certain desirable common ideas-individual rights, certain freedoms, personal security, and access to education and healthcare. It follows, then, that murder, theft, tyranny and poverty are being universally exposed as undesirable. To what degree this vast global cultural exchange is creating a common world culture should also be of interest to the strategic leader. Culture changes, albeit usually slowly. Attitudes toward war alter with demographics, particularly when single-child families become normal rather than exceptional. Add to demographics the slow but inexorable effect of the revolution in women's rights, and society is on course to regard war somewhat differently than it did even in the recent past. To the factors of demography and gender we must blend in the emergence of a highly individualistic, hedonistic, popular culture. As if those elements were not sufficient to trigger cultural change, we need to take account of a globalized mass media that reveals some of the seamier side of high policy and strategic behavior. Elements such as those just cited plainly are effecting a change, even a radical change, in the social and cultural context of war, in the West at least. Strategic culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives. 18 Strategic culture can be understood as a subset of national culture. While national culture describes the general proclivity of a society for certain modes of living, such as consumerism or the love of baseball in America, strategic culture more narrowly describes the cultural environment of the nation's policy-making community. The policy elites control the reigns of national power. They are the political class, including those serving in government, policy institutions, or academia, and, in an advisory role by law, the professional officer corps. These elites are responsible to the voting public, and create unpopular policy at their political peril. As Colin Gray states:
Rise of a Common
All policy and strategy is made at home. It will be influenced, perhaps triggered, sometimes dominated, by external considerations, but the making, administration, and execution of policy and strategy is a process embedded in the culture of a domestic context. 19 Thus domestic culture influences strategic culture. Strategic culture is most evident in a society's proclivity for war, and in the way it prosecutes war. 20 But it also includes the manner in which a nation conducts foreign policy, and how it balances its use of all forms of national power. Foreign policy and the use of national power are also influenced by external events, but are a secondary influence on domestic strategic culture.
When chronicling American strategic culture, the two most prescient factors are geography and history. 21 Unlike its Western European cultural cousins, the United
States was strategically isolated from the world's other major powers for over two centuries, safe from the threat of sudden invasion. This engendered a culture with a sense of security, and afforded policy-makers the luxury of opting to engage militarily in international conflicts or remain isolationist.
Since the end of the Federalist era in the early nineteenth century, American strategic culture has been dominated by liberal democratic idealism. 22 This has imbued the American psyche with a love-hate relationship about war. Samuel Huntington states that This extremism is required by the nature of the liberal ideology. Since liberalism deprecates the moral validity of the interests of the state in security, war must be either condemned as incompatible with liberal goals or justified as an ideological movement in support of those goals. American thought has not viewed war in the conservative-military sense as an instrument of national policy. 23 According to Huntington, when America does go to war, it is to advance or defend ideals like freedom or democracy. It is not culturally inclined to wage war to advance U.S. national security interests. 24 Nor does American strategic culture consider war as a continuation of policy, as Clausewitz would. 25 Despite having a history of occasional warfare separated by long periods of peace, and despite the current period of American military adventurism, classic American strategic culture actually discourages using military force as a policy tool.
Classic liberalism finds war to be a failure of policy, not an extension of policy.
Huntington writes "The total rejection of war accords with the liberal view that men are rational and that consequently they should be able to arrive at a peaceable solution of differences." 26 When America does use military force, it does so to spread democracy, in order to end the need for future war. As Thomas Mahnken posits, "The impulse to transform the international system in the service of liberal democratic ideals forms a strand that runs throughout American history." 27 Classic American liberalism considers even the existence of a large military force a threat to the state, which is vulnerable to takeover by a military coup. 28 According to
Huntington, the liberal believes that "Large military forces are a threat to peace." 29 They encourage corresponding arms races, which can lead to miscalculation or misunderstanding, and possible conflict. 30 Thus, after both world wars, and to a degree, after Viet Nam and Desert Storm, American policy makers drastically reduced the size and power of all branches of the military.
Additionally, a pacifist influence resides in America's strategic culture, which further discourages the use of military power. According to Huntington, this is mostly a middle class phenomenon. The United States has a prolific middle class which amplifies the pacifist influence on its strategic culture. America's liberal society, Huntington argued, required the protection of a professional military establishment steeped in conservative realism. In order to keep the peace, military leaders had to take for granted-and anticipate-the "irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature." Liberals were good at reform, not at national security" 32 Huntington's thesis argues that liberal democracy is a sound framework for a modern domestic society and the best protection against oligarchy, fascism and tyranny. But Today, finally, we have a choice between nationalism and integration: balance or openness. Chaos is tamed by empire; empires are broken up by nationalism; nationalism gives way, we must hope, to internationalism. At the end of the process is the freedom of the individual; first protected by the state and later protected from the state. 41 Cooper's internationalism describes the hope for an ever-expanding Western alliance of open, yet relatively weak, liberal democratic societies, enabled and connected by globalization, and so large that it is able to muster enough collective military power to counter threats from the east, even as it tries to convince nations from the East to join the global community of peaceful societies. This post-American, post-military idea would be well received in Europe and anywhere else that America's hegemony is resisted. Its main risks are assuming that China will rise peacefully, terrorist or state nuclear proliferation does not destroy the earth, and Russia does not aspire to violently remake the Soviet Union. 42 If the United States joined such a multilateral Western alliance, with a smaller American military and a newly robust foreign policy apparatus, it would remain true to its historic liberal strategic culture.
What helps make this strategic culture shift back to liberalism possible is demographics. In Inevitable Surprises, Peter Schwartz writes:
In the United States, English-speaking descendants of Western Europeans will find their majority yet more reduced-which means American laws, institutions, and culture is about to undergo a sea change. 43 The mass immigration to the West, an effect of globalization that is buoying American birth rates, is increasing the American population of ideological liberals. For the foreseeable future, American policy makers will make generally liberal decisions to satisfy a domestic electorate and allied Western global culture that is decidedly liberal.
Yet the future of globalization is unpredictable. A shock occurrence could accelerate, set back, or even derail globalization's progress. A severe terror strike on the U.S. homeland or a global economic collapse could temporarily sway the American strategic culture toward isolation and conservative militarism. 44 However, a current strategic environmental assessment should point toward different trends.
The current United States federal budget trend is unsustainable. The federal deficit is projected to top $1.2 trillion in 2009. This figure does not include the February 2009 economic stimulus bill which adds $789 billion to that figure. 45 In the longer term, the United States has looming Social Security and Medicare outlay shortfalls totaling up to $100 trillion. 46 These deficits must be funded by foreign investment in U. S. Treasury bills. However, foreigners may not be willing or able to finance much more of the United
States' debt. It is both illogical and strategically unwise to assume that the United States military budget will not come under intense scrutiny in the near future. Liberal policy- Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint. 48 In such a scenario, the need for employment of American military power would be The military strategic leader's main role is to give sound advice on military matters to policy makers. He or she must be prepared for the coming clash between social and military funding requirements. As the economic pressure mounts, the "globalists" will argue that a large, powerful American military is unaffordable, a threat to peace, and, due to the progression of civilization, no longer relevant. As the calls to dismantle the American military grow louder, military leaders must counter the post-military argument and remind the public that within and beyond the West, there exist many cultures that do not share a progressive liberal idealism, and threaten the progression to a future which can possibly be truly post-military.
Conclusion
For the strategic leader, globalization is best described as a force that opens or 
